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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellant/Petitioner

:

v.

:

MICHAEL VON FERGUSON

:

Case No. 20050376-SC

:

Respondent is incarcerated.

Appellee/Respondent

REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER

INTRODUCTION
This reply brief on cross-petition is limited to the issue raised on cross-petition in
Point II of the brief of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Michael Von Ferguson
("Respondent's brief). See page 25-49 of Respondent's brief. In Point II, Respondent
argued that since the judgment shows on its face that he was not represented by counsel,
the state had the burden of establishing a constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel in
order to use the prior conviction to enhance the current charge to a felony. See
Respondent's brief at 25-49. This cross-reply further demonstrates that the trial court
correctly placed the burden on the state, and the court of appeals erred in presuming that
Ferguson waived counsel and overturning the decision of the trial court. See trial court
ruling in Addendum A.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Claims that a defendant was denied his right to counsel have a "special status" in
post-conviction proceedings. This Court has recently recognized that this "special status"
precludes a court from presuming that a defendant waived counsel unless there is
evidence that the defendant affirmatively acquiesced in proceeding without counsel. This
is consistent with United States Supreme Court case law which precludes presuming
waiver of counsel from a silent record. Regardless of how this Court characterizes the
role of the presumption of regularity when the judgment shows that the defendant did not
have counsel - that it attaches but does not include a presumption that the defendant
waived counsel, that it attaches but is rebutted by the judgment showing that defendant
did not have counsel, or that it does not attach at all - this Court's case law and that of the
United States Supreme Court establish that a court cannot presume that the defendant
waived counsel.
The state's claim that the analysis for waiver of counsel claims set forth in Heaton
and Faretta does not apply in collateral proceedings is without merit. The state does not
cite to any cases that support this claim. Instead, the state relies on a single case where
the Court refused to apply the presumption employed on direct appeal for Boykin claims
in a collateral proceeding. But Boykin claims do not have the "special status" that
deprivation of counsel claims have, and the United States Supreme Court has made it
clear that right to counsel claims can be addressed in collateral proceedings.
Additionally, Heaton and a variety of other cases rely on collateral decisions which apply

2

the same analysis to lack of waiver of counsel claims as that which is applied on direct
appeal.
Finally, the state's claim that if it loses on certiorari, it nevertheless should be
given another chance to sustain its burden of proof should be rejected. Aside from the
state's failure to adequately brief this claim, the claim disregards the fact that the
enhancement has been dismissed in the trial court. The state has not cited any statutes,
rules or case law that would allow it to resurrect a dismissed enhancement, and it fails to
cite or consider case law that precludes refiling unless there is newly discovered evidence
or good cause. If this Court ultimately affirms the trial court ruling, there will be nothing
in the trial court to review. Additionally, if the state thought it could just try again in the
trial court to sustain its burden, it should have done so rather than taking this appeal and
subsequent certiorari review while Ferguson was being held pretrial in the county jail.
Allowing the state a "second bite of the apple" under these circumstances would
encourage poor preparation by prosecutors, be costly and time consuming to defendants
and courts, and lead to further delay in this case.
ARGUMENT
Reply on Cross-Petition
POINT. BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT SHOWED THAT FERGUSON WAS
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO
ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE WAIVER OF COUNSEL
This Court's recent decision in Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79, 539 Utah Adv.
Rep. 21 (see Addendum B) and other cases establish that the trial court correctly refused
to presume that Ferguson waived counsel. Regardless of whether the presumption did
3

not attach, attached but did not include a presumption that Ferguson's right to counsel
was preserved, or attached and was rebutted because Ferguson was not represented by
counsel, the burden was on the state to establish a constitutionally adequate waiver of
counsel since the judgment showed that Ferguson was not represented. In addition, the
state's claim in its reply brief that the analysis for assessing waiver of counsel claims
outlined in State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998) and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806 (1975) does not apply to post-conviction proceedings is without merit and should be
rejected. Moreover, the state's request that it should be given another chance to establish
that Ferguson waived counsel so as to reinstate the dismissed enhancement should be
denied since the state has had the opportunity to sustain its burden and the matter has
been dismissed below.
A. Waiver of Counsel Cannot Be Presumed
As the state acknowledges, this Court recently reiterated that a defendant's claim
that he was denied his right to counsel has a "special status" in post-conviction
proceedings. State's reply brief at 19-21, citing Lucero, 2005 UT 79,1J25 (see Addendum
B). Because of this "special status," even when the judgment enjoys a presumption of
regularity, waiver of counsel cannot be presumed. Id. This Court's recent discussion is
consistent with United States Supreme Court case law, this Court's cases, and cases from
other jurisdictions, all of which demonstrate that the government is required to establish
waiver of counsel when a judgment shows that the defendant was not represented.
Regardless of whether a presumption of regularity attaches and is rebutted or does not
attach at all, Lucero and other cases require that courts can not presume waiver under
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these circumstances. Id. In this case, where the only evidence placed before the trial
court at the motion to quash hearing showed that Ferguson was not represented by
counsel, the court of appeals erred in presuming that Ferguson made a constitutionally
adequate waiver of counsel. See State v. Ferguson, 2005 UT App 144, 1}31, 111 P.3d
820.
This Court recognized in Lucero that because of the "special status" of deprivation
of counsel claims, a court cannot presume waiver even when a presumption of regularity
attaches to a judgment. Lucero, 2005 UT 79,111124, 25. Although this Court
acknowledged that "where a defendant seeks to collaterally attack a court's judgment, we
presume the regularity of the proceedings below," it also recognized that such a
presumption does not include a presumption that the defendant waived counsel. Id. This
Court stated:
That presumption [of regularity] notwithstanding, the analysis of whether a
defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief is more complicated in cases where a
defendant raises a deprivation of counsel claim because of the "special status"
conferred upon the constitutional right to counsel. Lackawanna County Dist.
Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 404, 121 S.Ct. 1567, 149 L.Ed.2d 608 (2001)
(concluding that failure to appoint counsel claim "warrants special treatment
among alleged constitutional violations"); see Custis v. United States, 511 U.S.
485, 494-96, 114 S.Ct. 1732. 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (discussing the "historical
basis" for treating collateral attacks based on a denial of the right to counsel
differently than other constitutional rights). A court may not presume waiver of
the right to counsel unless there is some evidence that the defendant affirmatively
acquiesced to the waiver of counsel. See Carnley v. Cochran. 369 U.S. 506, 51617, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962) ("[N]o . . . burden [to overcome
presumption of regularity] can be imposed upon an accused unless the record - - or
a hearing, where required - - reveals his affirmative acquiescence."); State v.
Hamilton, 1987 Utah LEXIS 638 at T[5 (Waiver [of the right to counsel] may not
be presumed from a silent record.") see also Arbuckle v. Turner, 440 F.2d 586,
589 (10th Cir. 1971); Clark v. Turner, 283 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D. Utah 1968)
(same). If such evidence is presented, the defendant has the burden of proving that
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the right to counsel was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived. See
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92. 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004) ("[I]n a
collateral attack on an uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden to
prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the assistance
of counsel."); Carnley, 369 U.S. at 515, 82 S.Ct. 884 ("Presuming waiver [of the
right to counsel] from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or
there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer."); see also Dyett
v. Turner, 287 F.Supp. 113, 115-16 (D.Utah 1968) (imposing burden on defendant
to show invalidity of waiver of counsel when the record did not indicate that the
waiver was involuntary); McGhee v. Sigler, 328 F.Supp. 538, 542 (D.Neb.1971)
("[I]f there was acquiescence by the defendant in the trial court's not appointing
counsel, the burden then becomes the defendant's....").
Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ^[25. Contrary to the state's suggestion that this discussion should
be overturned or disregarded because it is not well reasoned and is dictum (state's reply
brief at 19-22), this Court should follow Lucero since the analysis challenged by the state
is based on well established case law and was integral to the Lucero decision. See id.
As this Court pointed out in Lucero, Lackawanna and Custis recognize the
"special status" afforded right to counsel claims. Id. (citing Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at
404; Custis, 11 U.S. at 496). Both of these cases indicate that the '"failure to appoint
counsel for an indigent [is] a unique constitutional defect. . . ris[ing] to the level of a
jurisdictional defect,' which therefore warrants special treatment among alleged
constitutional violations." Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 404 (quoting Custis, 511 U.S. at
496). In fact, the Court emphasized in Lackawanna that the special status of Gideon1
claims is well established, and because of that special status, created an exception
allowing defendants to challenge a prior conviction used to increase a federal sentence
even though the prior conviction was "conclusively valid" because the defendant had no
1

Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
6

further collateral attack available. Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 403-04.
Additionally, as the state recognizes, Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516-17, precludes a
court from "presuming] that a defendant waived counsel where the trial record is silent
on the matter." State's reply brief at 22. This Court recognized that rule in Lucero,
stating that "[a] court may not presume waiver of the right to counsel unless there is some
evidence that the defendant affirmatively acquiesced to the waiver of counsel." Lucero,
2005 UT 79, ^|25 (citing Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516-17). In addition, this Court quoted
Carnley for the proposition that a defendant does not have the burden to establish lack of
waiver '"unless the record - - or a hearing, where required - - reveals his affirmative
acquiescence [in proceeding without counsel].'" Lucero, 2005 UT 79, f25 (quoting
Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516-17).
The state attempts to undermine the rule of Carnley by unduly narrowing its
holding to circumstances where the trial court has reviewed the entire record of the prior
proceeding, including a transcript, and finds nothing to support a waiver of counsel. See
state's reply brief at 21-22. But Carnley explicitly precludes a court from presuming
waiver of counsel, regardless of what the parties put before it for review, unless the
evidence before the court indicates that the defendant acquiesced in proceeding without
counsel. See Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516-17. Moreover, the Carnley Court's statement that
either a record "or hearing where required" can establish whether a defendant waived
counsel (Id.) demonstrates that the Court did not limit its refusal to presume waiver to
only those circumstances where a court had a transcript before it and instead adopted a
rule that precluded presuming waiver when there was nothing before the court to suggest
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that the defendant had waived counsel. Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, Carnley
demonstrates that unless the state introduces evidence that a defendant who appeared pro
se waived counsel, the defendant cannot be required to overcome a presumption that his
right to counsel was preserved.
In addition to being solidly based on case law, Lucero's discussion of the burden
of proof was integral to the decision in that case. Lucero claimed that his right to counsel
had been violated in a justice court proceeding and filed a petition for post-conviction
review in district court. On certiorari, the justice court argued that the court of appeals'
decision that Lucero was not entitled to post-conviction relief because he had not
appealed should be upheld in part because "justice court defendants are not eligible to
receive post-conviction relief under the PCRA [Post-Conviction Remedies Act]."
Lucero, 2005 UT 79, T[9. According to the justice court, the lack of a record injustice
courts precluded post-conviction review of Lucero's claim that he was deprived of
counsel and supported the court of appeals' decision that a trial de novo appeal was
Lucero's only remedy. Id. Because of the important role played by presumptions and
burdens of proof, particularly when there is no record available, this Court necessarily
was required to discuss the manner in which Lucero's Gideon claim could be reviewed
since there was no record. Hence, this Court's discussion in Lucero indicating that a
court cannot presume waiver of counsel unless the record affirmatively demonstrates that
a defendant acquiesced in proceeding without counsel was necessary to the decision in
Lucero. See id.
Regardless of how this Court characterizes the role of the presumption of
8

regularity when the judgment shows the defendant was not represented by counsel,
Lucero and the cases cited therein demonstrate that the presumption does not require a
defendant to establish that he did not waive counsel unless the record affirmatively shows
that he agreed to proceed without counsel. See Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ^[25; Dyett v.
Turner, 287 F. Supp. 113, 115-16 (D. Utah 1968) (cited favorably in Lucero, 2005 UT
79, H25). In other words, regardless of whether the presumption does not attach, attaches
but does not include a presumption that the defendant waived counsel, or attaches but is
rebutted because the judgment shows that Ferguson did not have counsel, Lucero and the
cases cited therein support Ferguson's position that he cannot be required to establish that
he did not waive counsel. Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ^|25. In fact, Lucero, the cases cited
therein, Triptow, and other cases demonstrate that if the record shows that a defendant
waived counsel, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that the waiver was not
knowing and voluntary, but if the record simply shows that the defendant was not
represented without showing that he waived counsel, the burden remains with the state to
establish waiver. See Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ^|25; see also Dyett, 287 F.Supp. at 115-16.
Contrary to the state's assertions, Triptow does not override Lucero. See state's
reply brief at 24-5. Triptow involved circumstances where the judgment was silent as to
whether Triptow was represented by counsel, and this Court presumed that the trial court
had proceeded with regularity, which included a presumption that Triptow was
represented by counsel. State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989). In order to
rebut this presumption, Triptow was required to "raise the issue and produce some
evidence that he [ ] was not represented by counsel and did not knowingly waive
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counsel." Id. By contrast, this case and Lucero involve circumstances where the
defendant was not represented by counsel; because the record in Triptow did not show
that defendant was unrepresented, Triptow did not directly address the circumstances of
this case. Instead, well established case law which precludes presuming waiver of
counsel from a silent record controls and places the burden to establish waiver on the
state. See Lucero, 2005 UT 79.125.
Additionally, Triptow involved a felony conviction where this Court attached a
presumption of regularity, including a presumption that Triptow was represented by
counsel, to a judgment that did not show that Triptow was unrepresented. By contrast,
the conviction at issue in this case was a misdemeanor conviction taken during a busy
misdemeanor calendar where the details attendant to felony convictions are not always
observed. See generally Dressier v. State. 819P.2d 1288, 1295 (Nev. 1991) (recognizing
that because of "the informal nature of the prosecution of misdemeanor cases, [ ] the
stringent standard of review used in felony cases" does not apply). As set forth in
Respondent's opening brief at 35-36 and 44, some courts have recognized that
misdemeanors are not always given the same exacting protections that occur in felony
prosecutions and have therefore refused to apply a presumption of constitutional validity
or a presumption that the right to counsel was protected to a misdemeanor conviction
obtained under these circumstances. See e^g. Dressier. 819 P.2d at 1295. This Court
likewise should acknowledge the reality of busy misdemeanor calendars is that
constitutional protections are not always as carefully observed as they are in felony
prosecutions and refuse to presume that the right to counsel was observed in this case,
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especially in the face of a record showing that both the trial court and trial judge in this
case were unaware that Ferguson had a right to counsel in a suspended jail case. See
Respondent's brief at 35.
Despite the distinctions between this case and Triptow and this Court's more
recent analysis in Lucero, the state argues that Triptow controls and requires that a
defendant such as Ferguson must produce some evidence not only that he was
unrepresented but also that he did not waive counsel. State's reply brief at 32. In
addition to the fact that Triptow involved a felony prosecution and did not directly
address this issue since the judgment did not show that Triptow was unrepresented, the
rationale in Triptow and its selection of a middle ground position for assessing burdens of
proof further demonstrates that a defendant is not required to establish evidence of waiver
of counsel under these circumstances.
In fact, this Court rejected a position taken by some courts that requires defendants
to prove lack of representation and lack of a constitutionally adequate waiver and instead
embraced what it perceived to be as a fairer, middle ground position. Triptow, 770 P.2d
at 148-49. That position takes into account the presumption of regularity, but also allows
that presumption to be rebutted by a relatively minor showing by the defendant that his
right to counsel may have been violated. Under the current state of the law, given the
court of appeals' opinion in State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, 68 P.3d 1035, which
precludes a defendant from presenting "some evidence" that he did not waive counsel
through affidavits, pursuant to the state's argument, any defendant claiming that his right
to counsel was violated would be required to produce transcripts and court records,
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regardless of whether the judgment showed that the defendant appeared without counsel.2
Id. at TJ7. This would essentially place the burden on the defendant to establish "that there
was an actual lack of representation without a knowing waiver of counsel in the earlier
proceeding" in all cases. Triptow, 770 P.2d at 148. Since Triptow rejected this position,
the state's argument that the defendant is required to establish lack of waiver even though
the judgment shows he was not represented, fails under Triptow.
Moreover, the effect of the state's argument in this case, if successful, would be
that if a defendant did not produce court records or transcripts either because he could not
afford them or was not represented and did not know how to obtain them, the prior
conviction would be automatically admissible even though it showed that the defendant
was not represented. In other words, the state's analysis creates a presumption that the
defendant waived counsel which is contrary to Lucero and the controlling case law.
As Triptow acknowledges, some courts have taken a more stringent position and
required a defendant to establish that he did not waive counsel. See Triptow, 770 P.2d at
148-49. To the extent the state cites cases that apply this more stringent position, those
cases have no application in the face of Triptow's decision to apply a middle position and

2

Although the state claims that "placing the burden on defendant [to establish that he did
not waive counsel] makes sense because he is likely to know whether he was represented
and, if not, whether he waived counsel" (state's reply brief at 17), a defendant's assertion
that he did not have counsel and did not waive counsel is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption of regularity under Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, which is controlling in
Utah's trial courts. Since the state is seeking to use the conviction to prove an element of
a crime and has more resources and the ability to obtain a complete record, it actually
makes more sense to require the state to establish waiver. Additionally, since waiver of
counsel is a legal concept, the state's assertion that a defendant is in the best position to
know whether he waived counsel is incorrect.
12

this Court's recent discussion in Lucero. Additionally, cases that presumed waiver when
the record shows the defendant was not represented are inconsistent with United States
Supreme Court case law. See e.g. Carnley, 369 U.S. at 516-17.
Moreover, many of the cases cited by the state for the proposition that Ferguson
had the burden of proving waiver involve different circumstances than the present case.
For example, it is not clear whether the judgment in United States v. Quintana-Ponce,
129 Fed. Appx. 473, 475 (10th Cir. 2005) showed that the defendant appeared without
counsel, and in United States v. Cruz-Alcala, 338 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 2003), the record
was not silent regarding waiver and instead showed that defendant waived counsel. Id. at
1198. Other cases cited by the state such as State v. Probst, 339 Or. 612, 124 P.3d 1237
(Or. 2005) involved circumstances where the record showed that the defendant
acquiesced in proceeding without counsel after being informed of the right and the risks
of proceeding without counsel. As this Court recognized in Lucero, circumstances where
the record shows that the defendant acquiesced in proceeding without counsel are
different from the circumstances of this case where the record shows only that Ferguson
did not have counsel; when the record shows that the defendant agreed to proceed
without counsel, a court can place the burden of establishing that a waiver was not
knowingly and voluntarily made on the defendant. Lucero, 2005 UT 79, ^[25.
In this case where the judgment showed that Ferguson was not represented, the
trial court had before it "some evidence" demonstrating that his right to counsel was
violated. Pursuant to case law from this Court and the United States Supreme Court, the
trial court correctly concluded that it could not presume waiver of counsel, and the state's
13

failure to establish waiver of counsel required that the enhancement be stricken.
B. Heaton and Faretta Apply to Collateral Attacks
The state also argues, without any support, that case law governing waiver of
counsel in criminal cases applies only on direct review and not in the post-conviction
context. State's reply brief at 33. This Court should reject that claim because it is not
supported by case law, fails to take into account the "special status" of Gideon claims,
fails to ensure that the right to counsel is carefully protected, fails to suggest what
analysis, if any should be employed in collateral proceedings where the defendant's right
to counsel was violated in the trial court, and fails to acknowledge case law employing
exacting standards for determining waiver on collateral review.
Although the state claims that a defendant who is denied his right to counsel and
subsequently fails to appeal is precluded from arguing that he did not make a
constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel as required by State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911
(Utah 1998) and Faretta v. California, 402 U.S. 806 (1975) (state's reply brief at 33), the
state fails to back this claim with any case law suggesting that a right to counsel claim
cannot be raised in post-conviction review. See generally Utah R. App. P. 24(a)
(outlining requirements for adequate briefing); State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, TJ22,

P.3d

(further citation omitted) ("to be adequate, briefs must provide 'meaningful legal
analysis'"). Instead, the state relies solely on Parke v. Ralev. 506 U.S. 20 (1992), a
United States Supreme Court case that deals with the application of Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238 (1969) in a habeas proceeding. While the state is correct that the Court
concluded that Boykin's presumption of invalidity does not apply in the habeas context,
14

Parke does not support the state's claim that the analysis for waiver of counsel claims
outlined in Heaton, Faretta, and other cases does not apply on collateral review. See
Parke, 506 U.S. at 29.
United States Supreme Court case law, including Parke, has made it clear that
right to counsel claims are "subject to collateral attack in federal habeas court." Id. at 29
(citing inter alia Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). The Court has also made it
clear that deprivation of counsel claims have a "special status" and are given greater
protection than Boykin claims. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 493-97 (1994).
The Court in Custis distinguished Boykin claims from right to counsel claims,
emphasizing that habeas review of right to counsel claims has a "historical basis in our
jurisprudence" that "treat[s] the right to have counsel appointed as unique, perhaps
because of our oftstated view that 'the right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.'" Custis, 511 U.S. at 494
(further citation omitted). The Custis Court declined "to extend the right to attack
collaterally prior convictions used for sentence enhancement beyond the right to have
appointed counsel established in Gideon" by distinguishing the role of Boykin in a plea
hearing from the special role the right to counsel plays in a criminal proceeding. Id. at
496. Custis, which the state fails to acknowledge in making its argument that waiver of
counsel cases do not apply in habeas, establishes that Boykin claims such as the claim in
Parke do not enjoy the same protection as Gideon claims and also acknowledges that
deprivation of counsel claims can be reviewed collaterally. Id.; see also Lackawanna,
532 U.S. at 403 (when a defendant claims that his right to counsel was violated in a prior
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proceeding, an exception exists to general rule that defendant cannot attack a
"conclusively valid" prior conviction).
Additional case law demonstrates that cases analyzing the requirements for a
constitutionally valid waiver apply with equal force in the habeas context as they do on
direct review. Such application is critical to ensure that the right to counsel is observed
and concomitantly, to ensure the fairness of the trial court proceedings. See Custis, 511
U.S. at 494. For example, Carnley was a habeas case where the United States Supreme
Court considered whether the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel
and refused to employ presumptions in favor of waiver, pointing out that "to cast such a
burden on the accused is wholly at war with the standard of proof of waiver of the right to
counsel which we have laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst, [ ] ." Carnley, 369 U.S. at 514
(citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65). The high Court approached the waiver of counsel
issue in a manner similar to this Court's approach in Heaton, placing the responsibility on
the trial court to clearly establish that the defendant knowingly and willingly proceeded
without counsel and indicating that the preferred method would be for such a
determination "to appear upon the record." Id. at 515 (further citation omitted). The
Court stated in Carnley:
It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.'
'The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of
itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused - - whose life and liberty
is at stake - - is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and
weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is na
intelligent and competent waiver by an accused. While an accused may waive the
16

right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by
the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to
appear on the record.
Id. at 514 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464-65).
Without distinguishing between cases on direct review and those on collateral
view, the Court in Faretta also emphasized that a constitutionally adequate waiver
requires that a defendant "competently and intelligently [] choose self-representation"
and that to make such a choice, the defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what
he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open.'" Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835
(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel, McCann, 317 US 269, 279 (1942)). In fact,
Adams, the case relied on by the Faretta court for this proposition, was a habeas case.
See id.
Heaton itself indicates that there is no distinction between the analysis applied for
deprivation of counsel challenges raised on direct appeal and those raised in a habeas
proceeding. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917-19. In outlining the requirements for
establishing waiver, this Court relied on habeas cases as well as direct review cases. Id.
Quoting Johnson, a habeas case, this Court emphasized a trial court's "weighty
responsibility" in ensuring that any waiver of counsel is made intelligently and
competently. Id. at 917 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465). Additionally, still relying on
Johnson, this Court recognized that in light of the "heavy burden placed on the trial court
to protect this right, there is a presumption against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver
must be resolved in the defendant's favor." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917.
17

In concluding that "the court must advise the defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation 'so that the record will establish that "he knows what
he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open,'"" Heaton cited Faretta and Adams,
the underlying habeas case which gave rise to this language, as well as the habeas case of
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948). Id. at 918. Moreover, this Court
quoted the habeas case of Von Moltke for the proposition that '"[a] judge can make
certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made
only from penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances."'
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (quoting Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724). This Court's reliance on
both habeas and direct review cases in reaching its decision in Heaton further
demonstrates that the state's claim that the Heaton analysis does not apply in collateral
proceedings is without merit. See also Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724 (recognizing that a
constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel requires more than "the asking of several
standard questions followed by the signing of a standard waiver of counsel"); Lucero v.
Kennard, 2004 UT App 94, ^22-30, 89 P.3d 175 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (applying
Heaton and other waiver cases in post-conviction context).
Aside from the inadequacy of the state's briefing on this point, the state's claim
that Heaton and related cases do not apply in a habeas proceeding should be rejected
because it is contrary to case law and would undermine the important role of the right to
counsel in criminal cases.
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C. The State's Failure to Sustain Its Burden of Establishing Waiver Precludes
Further Attempts by the State to Reinstate the Dismissed Enhancement on
Remand
As a final matter, the state asks that this Court give it a second chance to sustain its
burden should this Court agree with the trial court that it was required to establish that
Ferguson waived counsel. State's reply brief at 34-36. According to the state, since this
is an interlocutory appeal, when this case is remanded it can again try to sustain its
burden of showing that Ferguson waived counsel in the prior proceeding. State's reply
brief at 34-36
The obvious problem with the state's argument is that the trial court dismissed the
enhancement; in the event this Court affirms the trial court, there is no enhancement in
place and nothing for the state to attempt to establish. The state has had the opportunity
to present the evidence to the trial court and to appeal the trial court ruling while
Ferguson has been incarcerated pretrial in the Salt Lake County Jail. The state had the
resources to obtain a transcript and its failure to do so in an effort to sustain its burden so
as to elevate this case to a felony should preclude a further opportunity to do so.
As the state concedes, either party could have introduced a transcript, but the state
was the moving party that was trying to add an element that would turn this crime into a
felony; by not making that effort in order to sustain its burden of proof, the state has
given up its ability to prosecute this charge as an enhanced felony. The state's failure to
obtain a transcript under these circumstances precludes a determination that Ferguson
waived counsel and "[a]t most, suggests apprehension on [the state's part] as to what a
transcript of the plea proceeding may disclose." State's reply brief at 36.
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As a threshold matter, the state has failed to include any authority supporting its
request that it be given another "bite of the apple" when this case returns to the trial court,
Because the state provides no support for its claim that even though the enhancement has
been dismissed, it can try again when the case is remanded, this Court should refuse to
review the claim. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a); Lee, 2006 UT 5, ^22 (requiring adequate
briefing in order to review an issue).
Moreover, fairness, due process, and the orderly administration of justice demand
that the state not be given "a second bite of the apple." State v. Aspen, 412 N.W. 2d 881,
884 (S.D. 1987). Ferguson has not yet gone to trial and has been in the Salt Lake County
Jail for thirty four months as of the date on which this reply brief is filed.3 If the state is
given the opportunity to further litigate this issue in the trial court, additional delay will
occur in that court and, in all likelihood, the state might again request interlocutory
review if it is unsuccessful. Indeed, the state's reply brief suggests that if it has the
opportunity to revisit this issue, legal arguments regarding what constitutes a
constitutionally adequate waiver will be raised. See state's reply brief at 33-34. Since
the state had the opportunity and responsibility to establish a waiver of counsel, the state
should not be afforded a second opportunity to "ameliorate] its weak and deficient
3

The state appealed the trial court's order and is also the petitioner on certiorari review.
This case has been on interlocutory review for more than two years as of the date of this
brief; the Court of Appeals granted the state's petition for interlocutory review on
January 30, 2004 (R. 323) and the trial court stayed proceedings on February 2, 2004. R.
325. If the state thought it could sustain its burden by providing a transcript of the prior
proceeding, it should have done so rather than requiring Ferguson to sit in the county jail
for this extended period of time while it pursued an appeal and certiorari review. The
state's request that it should be given a second chance to sustain its burden should be
denied under these circumstances.
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original evidentiary proof . . . ." Aspen, 412 N.W. 2d at 884. Subjecting Ferguson to
repeated hearings as the state attempts to assemble its case "is costly to the defendant and
state and time consuming of judicial resources." Id. at 884, n.5. In addition, it
encourages poor preparation by the state and fails to hold the state to its "responsibility to
assemble its proof, in good, effective professionalism, and proceed thereupon." Id- n.5.
Although Aspen was decided on double jeopardy grounds in a case where the
enhancement was presented for sentencing purposes, the rationale applies with equal or
greater force in this context where Ferguson has not yet gone to trial. See State v.
Rogers, 2005 UT App 379,1(28, 122 P.3d 661 (due process requires "that an unprepared
prosecutor should not be free to proceed against a defendant multiple times until her
preparation finally reaches the minimal level required for bindover"); State v. Brickey,
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) (fundamental fairness precludes prosecution from refiling
dismissed charges unless new evidence or other good cause exists). Allowing the state
repeated opportunities to sustain its burden of proof interferes with the orderly
administration of justice, encourages lack of preparation on the part of prosecutors and
subjects defendants to much lengthier pretrial delay. Accordingly, Ferguson requests that
the state not be given a "second bite of the apple" should this Court uphold the trial
court's ruling.
CONCLUSION
Appellee/Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Michael Ferguson, by and through counsel,
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the trial court and court of
appeals that a misdemeanor conviction with a suspended sentence obtained in violation of
21

the right to counsel cannot be used to enhance a subsequent charge to a felony.
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Ferguson also requests that this Court reverse the court of
appeals' decision that he had the burden of proving that he did not waive counsel, and
uphold the trial court's dismissal of the enhancement.

SUBMITTED this ; K _ day of February, 2006.

(
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JOAN C. WATT
DEBRA M. NELSON
VERNICE TREASE
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 031902097

MICHAEL VON FERGUSON,

Judge ROBIN W. REESE

Defendant.

The Defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover having come before this Court for
hearing in the above entitled matter on October 24th, 2003, and November 3 rd , 2003, in
which Defendant was represented by counsel, Vernice Trease, and the State was
represented by counsel, B. Kent Morgan and Alicia H. Cook, the Court having fully
considered the written memoranda and oral arguments of counsel, this Court now enters
its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER.

FINDINGS OF FACT
jth

1. On March 18;n, 2003, the defendant pled guilty to violating a protective order, a
class A misdemeanor, before Judge Medley in District Court case number
031901111, and was sentenced to 365 days in jail. The defendant was not

represented by counsel when he entered his plea. The jail sentence was
suspended in its entirety and the defendant was placed on probation.
2. On March 26th, 2003, the State filed an information alleging that the defendant
had committed Attempted Homicide, Violation of a Protective Order, Burglary,
and Theft of a Firearm. The protective order violation was enhanced to a third
degree felony based on the defendant's prior conviction in case number
031901111.
3. A preliminary hearing was held on August 26th, 2003, before Judge Iwasaki. The
State presented evidence that the defendant, while carrying a loaded rifle, had
climbed onto the roof of a building neighboring the victim's workplace. The
State also offered a certified copy of the prior conviction to support the enhanced
protective order violation. Defense counsel objected to the use of the prior
conviction, and argued that an uncounseled plea could not be used to enhance a
subsequent offense. The Court overruled the objection and at the conclusion of
the hearing found sufficient probable cause to bind over the Attempted Homicide
and Protective Order Violation charges.
4. On October 16th, 2003, counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Quash the
Bindover. The defense argued that the defendant's prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction could not be used to enhance the subsequent offense, and
urged the Court to strike the enhancement. The defense also argued that the
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing failed to establish that the defendant
had actually violated the protective order.

5. This Court heard oral arguments on October 24 ,2003. At the conclusion of the
arguments, the Court requested that counsel brief the application of Alabama v.
Shelton to the instant case, and scheduled further arguments for November 3 rd ,
2003.
6. During the November 3 rd hearing, counsel for the State argued that Shelton
prohibits the imposition of a suspended jail sentence given to a misdemeanor
defendant who did not have counsel, but does not invalidate the underlying
conviction for purposes of enhancing future crimes. Counsel for the defendant
argued that, whenever a suspended jail sentence is given to a misdemeanor
defendant, Shelton does not permit the use of that conviction for enhancement.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The defense's motion to quash the bindover for insufficient evidence is denied.
The State met its burden at the preliminary hearing of showing probable cause
regarding the Violation of a Protective Order charge. The defendant's efforts to
commit homicide against the victim also constitute a violation of the protective
order, which prohibits the defendant from committing or attempting to commit
acts of violence against the victim.
2. The defense's motion to quash the bindover of count II as a third degree felony is
granted. The Court agrees with the defense that under Alabama v.Shelton, a
defendant facing a misdemeanor charge is entitled to counsel when a jail sentence
is rendered, regardless of whether the sentence is suspended or actually imposed.
Defendant Ferguson did not have counsel at the time he entered his guilty plea

and received a suspended sentence, therefore the prior conviction cannot be used
to enhance count II unless the State presents evidence that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The Court disagrees with
the State's argument that Shelton only invalidates the jail sentence given pursuant
to an uncounselled misdemeanor conviction, and does not impact the conviction
itself.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the enhancement to count II is stricken, and
count II stands as a class A misdemeanor.

DATED this

( day of January, 2004.
BY THE COURT:

Judge ROBIN W JREESE

Approved as to form

mmmmmSBM

2005 UT 79

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURRANT, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
11
In this case, we are asked to consider whether the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") allows collateral attacks
on a justice court conviction when the defendant has failed to
seek a trial de novo. The court of appeals concluded that the
failure to seek a trial de novo bars a justice court defendant
from obtaining post-conviction relief. We granted certiorari to
review the court of appeals' opinion. We now affirm.

BACKGROUND
12
Petitioner Benjamin Frank Lucero was charged in the
Murray City Municipal Justice Court with driving under the
influence of alcohol, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2004), and
improper usage of lanes, id. § 41-6-61 (1998). Although the pretrial conference was continued twice so that Lucero could retain
private counsel, Lucero ultimately represented himself throughout
the proceedings at the justice court. At the justice court
hearing, Lucero pleaded guilty to driving under the influence,
and the court dismissed the charge of improper lane usage. The
justice court subsequently fined Lucero $1,850 and sentenced him
to 180 days in jail and eighteen months' probation. After
sentencing, the court found Lucero to be impecunious.1
13
Lucero subsequently filed a "Petition for PostConviction Relief or, in the alternative, a Motion to Correct
Illegally Imposed Sentence" in both the Murray Justice Court and
the Third District Court.2 In his petition, Lucero argued that
his sentence was imposed in violation of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. The district court, acting in an appellate
capacity, held a hearing to address Lucero's claims and, after
considering proffered testimony from the justice court judge,
affidavits from the justice court clerks, and testimony from
Lucero, concluded that no Sixth Amendment violation had occurred.
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Lucero's petition.
Lucero filed a timely appeal with the court of appeals to review
the district court's order.
SI4
In reviewing the district court's decision, the court
of appeals did not examine whether Lucero had effectively waived
his right to counsel at the justice court proceeding, but instead
affirmed the district court on the ground that Lucero was
ineligible for post-conviction relief because he failed to seek a
trial de novo in the district court before seeking post1

Although the docket is sparse, it appears that this
finding was made when determining whether Lucero was capable of
paying for an outpatient treatment program or the installation of
an interlock ignition.
2

The justice court, in its docket, lists four different
filing dates for petitions for post-conviction relief. The first
petition for post-conviction relief was filed with the Murray
Justice Court on July 3, 2002, within thirty days of the date the
justice court judgment was rendered. The record does not
indicate that a petition was filed with the Third District Court
until nearly a month later, on August 1, 2002.
No. 20040339
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conviction relief. Lucero v. Kennard, 2004 UT App 94, f 13, 89
P.3d 175. The court of appeals reasoned that any violation of
Lucero's constitutional right to counsel could have been remedied
by a trial de novo and, by failing to pursue that remedy, Lucero
was both procedurally barred from receiving post-conviction
relief and ineligible for the "unusual circumstances" exception
to the procedural bar rules. Id. SI 12. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3) (a) (2002) .
STANDARD OF REVIEW
515
On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision
for correctness, giving its conclusions of law no deference.
State v. Geukaeuzian. 2004 UT 16, SI 7, 86 P.3d 7 4 2 .
ANALYSIS
516
The issue in this case is whether Lucero is eligible
for post-conviction relief.
To address this issue we must
determine (1) whether the PCRA applies to justice court
defendants and, if so, (2) whether Lucero is entitled to postconviction relief despite his failure to seek a trial de novo to

appeal his justice court sentence. We conclude that the PCRA
applies to justice court defendants, but that Lucero is not
entitled to post-conviction relief because he failed to seek a
trial de novo.
517
By filing a post-conviction petition, a defendant seeks
to collaterally attack a conviction or sentence. Rudolph v.
Galetka, 2002 UT 7, SI 5, 43 P.3d 467. In 1996, the legislature
enacted the PCRA to "establish!] a substantive legal remedy for
any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal
offense,"3 Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102 (1) (2002), has a valid

3

The PCRA does not apply to
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not
challenge a conviction or sentence for a
criminal offense;
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
or
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and
Parole.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102 (2) (2002).
3
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ground for relief,4 id. § 7£-35a-104, and is not procedurally
barred from bringing a claim for relief, id. § 78-35a-106.
18
Respondent, Murray City Justice Court (the "Justice
Court") argues that Lucero is precluded from receiving postconviction relief for two reasons: (1) the PCRA does not apply to
justice court defendants and, even if it does, (2) Lucero is
procedurally barred from receiving post-conviction relief due to
his failure to seek de novo review in the district court. Lucero
responds that the PCRA does not limit post-conviction relief to
4

The PCRA establishes five grounds for post-conviction
relief:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the
sentence was imposed in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a
statute that is in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or
the conduct for which the petitioner was
prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful
manner, or probation was revoked in an
unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance
of counsel in violation of the United States
Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists
that requires the court to vacate the
conviction or sentence . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1).
Lucero attacks his sentence under section 78-35a104(1) (a) , arguing that his sentence was imposed in violation of
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court of appeals did
not assess whether the trial court correctly found that Lucero
had effectively waived his right to counsel and was therefore not
entitled to post-conviction relief. The court of appeals instead
held that Lucero was procedurally barred from receiving postconviction relief because he had failed to file for a trial de
novo in the district court. Lucero v. Kennard, 2004 UT App 94,
It 13, 89 P. 3d 175. Thus, for the purposes of this proceeding, we
will assume that if the deprivation of counsel claim contained in
Lucero's petition is true, he would have grounds for postconviction relief. See Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah
1978) (proceeding "upon the assumption that if [the defendant's]
claims as to the violation of his basic constitutional rights
were true they might bring him within purview of habeas corpus").
No. 20040339
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district court defendants and, because he could not argue at a
trial de novo that the justice court had violated his right to
counsel, his failure to pursue a trial de novo does not
procedurally bar him from seeking post-conviction relief. We
will address each of the arguments in the order presented.
I. THE PCRA APPLIES TO JUSTICE COURT DECISIONS
19
We first address the Justice Court's contention that
justice court defendants are not eligible to receive postconviction relief under the PCRA. We conclude that the PCRA does
not preclude justice court defendants from receiving postconviction relief.
110 Justice courts are distinct from traditional district
courts in a number of respects. For example, justice courts are
created by municipalities or counties, Utah Code Ann. § 78-5101.5 (2002); have jurisdiction over only certain small claims
cases, class B and C misdemeanors, and other minor offenses, id.
§ 78-5-104; and do not maintain a record of the proceedings
before them, id. § 78-5-101.
111 Because justice courts do not maintain a record of
their proceedings, "the appeals process from a justice court
decision is unique." Bernat v. Allohin, 2005 UT 1, 1 8, 106 P.3d
707. To appeal a sentence or conviction, a justice court
defendant must undergo a trial de novo in the district court,
instead of having an appellate court examine the record of the
proceedings below to review the lower courts' decision. See id.;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(1); cJL. Dean v. Henriod, 1999 UT App
50, 91 9 n.l, 975 P.2d 946 ("In the traditional appeal, a
court . . . reviews the trial court's record and either affirms
or reverses the judgment entered therein."). This trial de novo
to appeal from a justice court decision is similar to other
trials de novo in the sense that the defendant has the
opportunity to "relitigate the facts as to his guilt or
innocence" as if the case had originated there. Bernat, 2005 UT
1, ! 31. But such a trial de novo is not a trial de novo "in the
strictest sense" because the district court cannot impose a
greater sentence than that imposed at the justice court
proceeding. Id. 1 31 n.12.
112 In this case, rather than seek a trial de novo to
appeal his justice court sentence, Lucero filed a petition for
post-conviction relief. The PCRA entitles "any person who
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense" to
post-conviction relief, provided that person meets certain
requirements. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102 (emphasis added).

5
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Despite this broad language, which does not appear to limit postconviction relief to criminal cases filed in district courts, the
Justice Court claims that the relief provided by the PCRA does
not apply to justice court defendants for two reasons. First, it
argues that the language of the PCRA and the procedural
provisions governing the act's operation contain requirements
that cannot be fulfilled by justice court defendants. Second,
the Justice Court argues that, without a record to review, it is
so difficult for a district court to determine what occurred at
the justice court proceeding below that review of a postconviction petition in such situations is impracticable. We will
analyze each argument in turn.
513 Before addressing the Justice Court's arguments,
however, it should first be noted that the PCRA cannot limit this
court's authority to review justice court defendants' petitions
for post-conviction relief. See Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42,
SI 17, 94 P. 3d 263. Under the Utah Constitution, "the power to
review post-conviction petitions 'quintessentially . . . belongs
to the judicial branch of government.'" Id. (quoting Hurst v.
Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989)); see. also Utah Const, art.
VIII, § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs . . . . " ) . Thus, "the legislature
may not impose restrictions which limit [post-conviction relief]
as a judicial rule of procedure, except as provided in the
constitution." Gardner, 2004 UT 42, SI 17 (internal quotation
omitted). To the extent the PCRA "purports to erect an absolute
bar to this court's consideration of . . . post-conviction
petitions, it suffers from constitutional infirmities." Id.
Accordingly, the enactment of the PCRA did not, and could not,
limit this court's right to grant post-conviction relief to
justice court defendants. Having clarified this point, we now
turn to the Justice Court's arguments concerning the PCRA's
applicability to justice court proceedings.
A. The Requirements of the PCRA May Be Fulfilled by Justice Court
Defendants•
114 The Justice Court claims that justice court defendants
cannot fulfill the requirements contained within the PCRA and its
procedural provision, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C,5 and that
the defendants are therefore ineligible for post-conviction
relief. Specifically, the Justice Court argues that a justice
court defendant cannot fulfill the PCRA's requirements that (1) a
5

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C "govern[s] proceedings in
all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under [the PCRA]."
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a).
No. 20040339
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petition for post-conviction relief be filed "in the district
court of original jurisdiction," Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1);
(2) a defendant directly appeal or otherwise have an on-therecord review of their conviction or sentence before seeking
post-conviction relief, id. § 78-35a-102; and (3) a clerk assign
and deliver a petition for post-conviction relief to the judge
who sentenced the petitioner, Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(f). We are not
persuaded.
115 First, the Justice Court argues that a justice court
defendant cannot file a petition in the district court with
original jurisdiction because district courts do not have
original jurisdiction over justice court cases. This assertion
is incorrect because the scope of a district court's original
jurisdiction is defined more broadly than the scope of its
subject matter -jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1),
(8). Utah Code section 78-3-4, which delineates the scope of a
district court's jurisdiction, differentiates between a district
court's original and subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The
statute states that the district court has original jurisdiction
over "all matters civil and criminal," not prohibited by the
constitution or law, id. § 78-3-4(1), but notes that, that
" [notwithstanding," the district court generally does not have
subject matter jurisdiction over justice court cases, 6 id. § 783-4(8). Therefore, a justice court defendant may file a petition
for post-conviction relief in the district court of original
jurisdiction by filing it with the district court located in the
6

Notwithstanding [the scope of a district
court's original jurisdiction], the district
court has subject matter jurisdiction in
class B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors,
infractions, and violations of ordinances
only if:
(a) there is no justice court with
territorial jurisdiction;
(b) the matter was properly filed in the
circuit court prior to July 1, 1996;
(c) the offense occurred within the
boundaries of the municipality in which the
district courthouse is located and that
municipality has not formed a 5 u s t i c e court;
or
(d) they are included in an indictment or
information covering a single criminal
episode alleging the commission of a felony
or a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (8) (2002).
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same district as the justice court.
116 Second, the Justice Court argues that justice court
defendants cannot fulfill the PCRA requirements because they
cannot directly appeal a conviction or receive an on-the-record
review of the proceedings below. The Justice Court cites three
instances in which the PCRA and rule 65C require a defendant to
directly appeal a conviction or sentence in order to be eligible
for post-conviction relief. First, to be entitled to postconviction relief, the PCRA states that a defendant must have
"exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal."
Id. § 78-35a-102. Second, rule 65C requires that the petition
for post-conviction relief state "whether the judgment . . . has
been reviewed on appeal." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (C) (4). Third,
rule 65C requires that the petition for post-conviction relief
include a copy of "any opinion issued by an appellate court
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case." Id.
65C(d) (2) .
117 Nowhere in the PCRA or rule 65C, however, are on-therecord reviews and direct appeals mandated. Instead, the
provisions cited by the Justice Court merely require that
defendants pursue a direct appeal if that remedy is available and
that the petition for post-conviction relief include a statement
about whether an appeal has occurred and, if it has, a copy of
that appeal. Thus, justice court defendants can meet the PCRA
requirements by exhausting the available legal remedies and
including in their petitions for post-conviction relief a
statement that the justice court judgment has not been reviewed
on appeal.
118 Third, the Justice Court argues that a clerk cannot
assign a petition for post-conviction relief to the judge who
sentenced the petitioner because justice court judges do not have
jurisdiction over petitions for post-conviction relief. This
argument fails because rule 65C allows a clerk to assign the
petition "in the normal course" if the judge who sentenced the
defendant is unavailable. Id. 65C(f).
119 In short, justice court defendants can fulfill all of
the requirements that the PCRA and rule 65C place on defendants
seeking post-conviction relief.
B. A Court May Review Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief
Without a Record.
120 We next address the Justice Court's argument that a
district court cannot determine whether to grant post-conviction
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relief to justice court defendants because the absence of a
record of the proceedings below renders a review of the petition
impracticable. Although a review without the aid of a record may
be more difficult than a review in which a record is available,
we conclude that a court is capable of determining whether a
justice court defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief
even without a record of the proceedings below.
SI21 The Justice Court supports its argument that a record
is essential for an appellate court to conduct a meaningful
review of the justice court's proceedings by citing to Jones v.
State, 789 N.E.2d 478 (Ind. 2003). In Jones, the Indiana Supreme
Court noted that Indiana's post-conviction relief statute seemed
generally applicable, but held that it was written with courts of
record in mind because a transcript of the trial was necessary to
assess the types of claims asserted in post-conviction
proceedings. Id. at 480. The court reasoned that the claims
generally raised in petitions for post-conviction relief are
dependent on what happened in the proceedings below. Id. As an
example, the court noted that for an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, a review of the record was necessary to examine
the adequacy of counsel's performance. Id. at 481. Without a
transcript, the court would be forced to rely on "the memories of
the participants in a misdemeanor trial that occurred years in
the past." Id.
ST22 Jones, however, is inharmonious with our case law.
While we have previously recognized the difficulty that an
appellate court may have in deciding whether to grant postconviction relief without a record of the proceedings below, we
have also reviewed petitions for post-conviction relief without
the aid of a record. See Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 529
(Utah 1978). In Webster, this court reviewed a city court
defendant's petition for post-conviction relief based on a denial
of the defendant's right to counsel. Id. Although there was no
record and the court acknowledged that the plaintiff's testimony
was "self-serving," the court was able to adequately discern what
happened at the proceedings below by looking at the court docket
and considering the plaintiff's own testimony. Id.
1123 Furthermore, in instances where there is even less
evidence of what occurred at the proceeding below than that
presented in Webster, a court may determine whether a party is
entitled to post-conviction relief by deciding who has the burden
of proof and whether that burden has been met. The absence of a
record does not foreclose post-conviction challenges, but merely
makes it more difficult for a party to meet the applicable
burden.
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<I24 In a proceeding where a defendant seeks to collaterally
attack a court's judgment, we presume the regularity of the
proceedings below. Price v. Turner, 502 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah
1972) ("After one has been convicted of crime [sic] the
presumption of innocence and other protections afforded an
accused no longer obtain. The presumptions then are in favor of
the propriety of the proceedings . . . . " ) ; see also Johnson v.
Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) ("When collaterally attacked,
the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of
regularity."), overruled on other grounds bv Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981). The petitioner bears the burden of
overcoming this presumption by a preponderance
of the evidence.
See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957); Johnson, 304
U.S. at 469; see also Price, 502 P.2d at 122 (placing burden of
rebutting presumption of regularity upon the petitioner).
125 That presumption notwithstanding, the analysis of
whether a defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief is more
complicated in cases where a defendant raises a deprivation of
counsel claim because of the "special status" conferred upon the
constitutional right to counsel. Lackawanna County Dist.
Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 404 (2001) (concluding that
failure to appoint counsel claim "warrants special treatment
among alleged constitutional violations"); see Custis v. United
States. 511 U.S. 485, 494-96 (1994) (discussing the "historical
basis" for treating collateral attacks based on a denial of the
right to counsel differently than other constitutional rights).
A court may not presume waiver of the right to counsel unless
there is some evidence that the defendant affirmatively
acquiesced to the waiver of counsel. See Carnlev v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506, 516-17 (1962) ("[N]o . . . burden [to overcome a
presumption of regularity] can be imposed upon an accused unless
the record—or a hearing, where required—reveals his affirmative
acquiescence."); State v. Hamilton, 1987 Utah LEXIS 638 at *5
("Waiver [of the right to counsel] may not be presumed by a
silent record."); see also Arbuckle v. Turner, 440 F.2d 586, 589
(10th Cir. 1971) (holding that waiver of the right to counsel
cannot be presumed); Clark v. Turner, 283 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D.
Utah 1968) (same). If such evidence is presented, the defendant
has the burden of proving that the right to counsel was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived. See Iowa v.
Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004) ("[I]n a collateral attack on an
uncounseled conviction, it is the defendant's burden to prove
that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to
the assistance of counsel."); Carnlev, 369 U.S. at 515
("Presuming waiver [of the right to counsel] from a silent record
is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an
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allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the
offer."); see also Dyett v. Turner, 287 F. Supp. 113, 115-16 (D.
Utah 1968) (imposing burden on defendant to show invalidity of
waiver of counsel when the record did not indicate that the
waiver was involuntary); McGhee v. Sialer, 328 F. Supp. 538, 542
(D. Neb. 1971) ("[I]f there was acquiescence by the defendant in
the trial court's not appointing counsel, the burden then becomes
the defendant's . . . . " ) .
126 In this case Lucero seeks post-conviction relief based
on an alleged violation of his right to counsel. Like the court
in Webster, the district court attempted to discern what occurred
in the proceedings below by looking at the court docket and
accepting testimony and other evidence. After considering the
evidence, the district court determined that Lucero effectively
waived his right to counsel and that he was not entitled to postconviction relief.
127 As demonstrated by the proceedings in Webster and in
the district court below, the task of determining whether to
grant post-conviction relief without a record, although
difficult, is not impossible. Even though the task of discerning
what occurred at the proceedings below is sometimes onerous, it
is still a judicial duty, and difficulty is not an argument for
shirking that duty.
II. LUCERO IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
128 Having determined that the PCRA applies to justice
court defendants, we now turn to the central issue in this case:
whether Lucero is eligible for post-conviction relief even though
he failed to seek a trial de novo to appeal from the justice
court decision. Because Lucero did not exhaust his legal
remedies when he failed to seek a trial de novo and does not
qualify for the unusual circumstances exception to the procedural
bar rules, we conclude that he is not eligible for such relief.
129 Our common law post-conviction jurisprudence is
markedly different than the PCRA. Most notably, under our common
law jurisprudence, a defendant is procedurally barred from
receiving post-conviction relief in instances where "a contention
of error [was] known or should have been known to the petitioner
at the time of judgment," and the defendant failed to raise the
error and appeal it "through the regular and prescribed
procedure." Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, 1 14, 44 P.3d 626.
In contrast, the PCRA contains two provisions that significantly
limit a defendant's right to seek post-conviction relief. First,
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section 78-35a-106 precludes a petitioner from receiving postconviction relief if the ground for relief
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or
by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on
appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at
trial or on appeal [unless due to ineffective
assistance of counsel];
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous
request for post-conviction relief or could
have been, but was not, raised in a previous
request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the [one-year] limitation
period established in Section 78-35a-107.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2002). Second, to be eligible for
post-conviction relief, the defendant must have "exhausted all
other legal remedies, including a direct appeal." Id. § 78-35a102.
f30 Also, under our common law post-conviction
jurisprudence, in instances where a defendant was procedurally
barred from receiving post-conviction relief, a court could
nevertheless grant such relief if the court determined that
unusual circumstances existed. Carter, 2001 UT 96, SI 15; see
also Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035-36 (Utah 1989). An
equivalent exception is noticeably absent from the PCRA.
5131 Despite these apparent differences, the PCRA does not
place any additional restrictions on this court's ability to
review petitions for post-conviction relief, nor does it limit
our ability to apply common law exceptions to the procedural bar
rules codified therein. See supra 1 12; see also Gardner v.
Galetka, 2004 UT 42, fl 9, 17-18, 94 P.3d 263 (holding that our
common law post-conviction procedural bar jurisprudence survived
the enactment of the PCRA).
132 In this case, the Justice Court contends that Lucero is
ineligible for post-conviction relief because he failed to pursue
a trial de novo. Even though the Justice Court concedes that a
claim that a constitutional right has been violated in the
proceeding below cannot be raised at the trial de novo, it argues
that such a proceeding is an available legal remedy for such
claims. In this case, we rely on the PCRA's exhaustion of
remedies requirement to determine whether Lucero is eligible for
post-conviction relief because that requirement is consistent
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with our common law procedural bar jurisprudence, which requires
a defendant to raise a known error and appeal it through regular
and prescribed procedures. Carter, 2001 UT 96, 1 14. Therefore,
to determine whether the court of appeals erred in dismissing
Lucero's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, we must first
ascertain whether Lucero exhausted his legal remedies. Then, if
he did not, we must determine whether unusual circumstances exist
that excuse his failure to exhaust his legal remedies.
A. Lucero Failed to Exhaust His Legal Remedies
133 To determine whether Lucero was eligible for postconviction relief, we must first ascertain whether he exhausted
his legal remedies. Because Lucero failed to pursue a trial de
novo, which would have provided a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy to the violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
we conclude that he did not.
134 Lucero argues that he was not required to seek a de
novo trial to be eligible for post-conviction relief because his
claim that he was deprived of counsel at the justice court
proceeding could not be raised in a de novo trial. The Justice
Court does not refute this contention, but instead asserts that
Lucero is not eligible for post-conviction relief because the
deprivation of his right to counsel could have been remedied at
such a trial. We agree with the Justice Court.
135 Other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have
adopted two different approaches: (1) allowing justice court
defendants to elect between filing for a trial de novo, thereby
waiving their constitutional claims, or filing for postconviction relief, see Commonwealth v. Speights, 509 A.2d 1263,
1264 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); and (2) allowing a district court
to review constitutional due process claims at the trial de novo,
see Hardin v. People, 216 P.2d 429, 430 (Colo. 1950) ("All
[complaints, including denial of counsel,] could have been urged
on appeal to the county court . . . . " ) . The Justice Court
advocates yet another approach—requiring all justice court
defendants to undergo a trial de novo before seeking postconviction relief.
136 We decline to adopt any of these approaches as each is
inharmonious with the nature of and policy behind post-conviction
relief. To be eligible for post-conviction relief, defendants
have consistently been required to appeal errors through regular
and prescribed procedures in order to prevent extraordinary
relief from being used as a substitute for normal appellate
procedures. See Carter, 2001 UT 96, 1 14; Codianna v. Morris,
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660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983). As an extraordinary remedy,
post-conviction relief can only be granted w[w]here no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available." Utah R. Civ. P.
65B.
137 Therefore, we must reject the election-of-remedy
approach because it would establish post-conviction relief as an
available substitute to normal appellate procedure in direct
contravention of the purpose behind extraordinary relief.
Furthermore, such an approach may lead to inconsistent remedies
for identical constitutional violations depending upon what
remedy the justice court defendant elected. We also reject the
approach that allows a district court to examine constitutional
due process claims at a trial de novo and the approach that
requires a defendant to undergo a trial de novo, because these
approaches would either expand the scope of a trial de novo or
lead to a waste of judicial resources in situations where a trial
de novo could not remedy the alleged constitutional violation.
538 Instead, we adopt a more flexible test. As mentioned
above, to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a petitioner
must pursue any regular and prescribed method for attacking a
conviction or sentence that would provide a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The regular and
prescribed method for appealing a justice court conviction is to
seek a trial de novo in the district court. Utah Code Ann. § 785-120 (2002). Thus, the critical inquiry to determine whether a
justice court defendant must seek a de novo trial in order to
meet the exhaustion requirement and be eligible for postconviction relief is this: could a trial de novo provide the
justice court defendant with a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
for the alleged constitutional violation? In other words, where
an appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation would be a
new trial, a justice court defendant must undergo a trial de novo
to meet the exhaustion requirement. To obtain post-conviction
relief if a justice court defendant has not sought a trial de
novo, the defendant must establish that the constitutional
violation was the kind that would demand relief beyond a new
trial.7

7

A trial de novo may not be an adequate remedy for certain
constitutional violations such as failure to grant a speedy trial
or when exculpatory evidence has been lost or destroyed. Also, a
court must dismiss a case with prejudice in instances where
prosecutorial misconduct is so severe that lesser sanctions could
not result in a fair trial. U.S. v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd.. 149
F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir. 1998); see New Mexico v. Eder, 704
(continued...)
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139 In this case, Lucero has alleged that he was deprived
of his right to counsel. Both the federal and Utah constitutions
guarantee a defendant's right to counsel. U.S. Const, amend. VI;
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. "Concomitant with this right is the
criminal defendant's guaranteed right to elect to present his own
defense." State v. Hassan. 2004 UT 99, 1 21, 108 P.3d 695.
540 When a defendant elects to proceed pro se, is
convicted, and subsequently attacks the conviction or sentence
based on a deprivation of the right to counsel, the court must
determine whether the defendant exercised the "right to selfrepresentation voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Id.
If the court concludes that the waiver was ineffective, the court
may remedy the violation of that right in a number of ways. See
generally Karen L. Ellmore, Annotation, Relief Available for
Violation of Right to Counsel at Sentencing in State Criminal
Trial, 65 A.L.R. 4th 183 (2004) (listing forms of relief
available when counsel is absent from a sentencing hearing). For
example, a court may vacate the sentence and order a new trial,
Billings v. Smith, 932 P.2d 1058, 1063 (Mont. 1997) (vacating
sentence and granting new trial to remedy denial of effective
assistance of counsel); modify the defendant's sentence with or
without a new penalty hearing, see Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d
7

(. . .continued)
P.2d 465, 467-69 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing cases where
dismissal with prejudice is required to remedy prosecutorial
misconduct). For example, prosecutorial misconduct that is
severe enough to prevent a trial de novo from providing an
adequate remedy for an alleged constitutional violation includes
the following: when the prosecutor has prevented a defendant
from collecting evanescent, exculpatory evidence, McNutt v.
Arizona, 648 P.2d 122, 125 (Ariz. 1982) ("Dismissal of the case
with prejudice is the appropriate remedy because the State's
action foreclosed a fair trial by preventing petitioner from
collecting exculpatory evidence no longer available."); when
there is a failure to prosecute, Utah Rules of Crim. P. 25(b)(1);
when the state refuses to identify an informant, Harris v.
Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 24, 26-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)
("If the original trial without [the identity of a material
witness] was unfair, a retrial sans same would be nothing but a
replay of a constitutionally defective record."); when an
informant or other inappropriate party was present during
privileged conversations, U.S. v. L e w , 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3d
Cir. 1978); or when the prosecutor has breached a bargain not to
prosecute, see U.S. v. Pascal, 496 F. Supp 313, 319 (N.D. Ill
1979).
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608, 611 (Utah 1994) (discussing correctness of trial court's
decision to grant defendant a new penalty hearing and appeal to
remedy the alleged denial of effective assistance of counsel);
Kuehnert v. Turner. 499 P.2d 839, 840-41 (Utah 1972) (remanding
for resentencing hearing to remedy absence of counsel at
sentencing); preserve the original sentence if the court finds
that the defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of counsel,
see State v. Neal. 262 P.2d 756, 758-59 (Utah 1953) (preserving
original sentence because sentencing was merely a ministerial act
and counsel could not have assisted defendant at sentencing); or,
in "comparatively few" cases, set aside the sentence and release
the defendant from confinement, Ellmore, supra Sf 39, at 192;
Shavesteh v. S. Salt Lake, 217 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 2000)
("By denying the defendant counsel, the court effectively waives
its right to sentence him to prison." (internal quotation
omitted)).
1141 Although a trial de novo may not be the justice court
defendant's preferred alternative, it provides an adequate remedy
for a deprivation of counsel claim because the district court can
appoint counsel at the "critical guilt adjudication stage." See
Alabama v. Shelton. 535 U.S. 654, 668 n.5 (2002). In fact, the
de novo trial is a more favorable form of appeal than that
offered to redress constitutional violations committed at the
district court level. Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, 1 41, 106
P.3d 707 ("[A] justice court defendant is . . . treated more
favorably than a similarly situated district court defendant.");
see also Jones v. State, 789 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ind. 2003) (noting
that a trial de novo is "the most congenial form of appeal").
Before an appellate court may order a new trial in an appeal from
a district court, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether there was prejudicial error in the
proceedings below. See Bernat, 2005 UT 1, f 18; Utah v.
Arauelles. 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) (requiring defendant to
show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant); Jones, 789 N.E.2d at 480. In the justice court
context, however, a justice court defendant has a "second
opportunity to relitigate the facts relating to his or her guilt
or innocence" as a matter of right. Bernat. 2005 UT 1, ! 41.
Accordingly, we conclude that Lucero did not exhaust his legal
remedies because any violation of Lucero's right to counsel could
have been adequately remedied by a trial de novo.
B. Unusual Circumstances Exception
f42 Having determined that Lucero failed to exhaust his
legal remedies, we now turn to the issue of whether unusual
circumstances exist that excuse this omission. We conclude that
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Lucero is not eligible for post-conviction relief under the
unusual circumstances exception.
143 The unusual circumstances exception provides a
defendant who is otherwise ineligible to receive post-conviction
relief an opportunity to have a petition for post-conviction
relief reviewed. Carter, 2001 UT 96, 1 15; Hurst. 777 P.2d at
1035. Therefore, once a court determines that a defendant is
procedurally barred from seeking post-conviction relief, the
court must then ascertain whether the defendant is nevertheless
entitled to have an appellate court review the petition because
unusual circumstances exist.
144 Lucero argues that the court of appeals misapplied the
unusual circumstances exception by improperly combining the
exhaustion of remedies and unusual circumstances analyses.
Although we recognize that the unusual circumstances exception
requires an analysis independent of the exhaustion of remedies
analysis, we conclude that the court of appeals properly
determined that unusual circumstances do not exist in this case.
145 To qualify for the unusual circumstances exception to
the procedural bar rules, a petitioner must demonstrate that "an
obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right" has occurred. Carter, 2001 UT 96, 1 15;
see also Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035. "The unusual circumstances
test was intended to assure fundamental fairness and to require
reexamination of a conviction on habeas corpus when the nature of
the alleged error was such that it would be unconscionable not to
reexamine . . . and thereby to assure that substantial justice
was done." Holden, 888 P.2d at 613 (internal quotation omitted).
146 In this case, Lucero has not demonstrated that unusual
circumstances exist that excuse his failure to seek a trial de
novo. He filed his petition for post-conviction relief within
thirty days of the date that the justice court entered its
sentence. At that time, Lucero was still statutorily eligible to
file for a trial de novo. Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (2002) . The
record indicates that Lucero was represented by counsel at the
time he decided to pursue post-conviction relief instead of a
trial de novo. Given these facts, the circumstances surrounding
this case do not rise to the level of an obvious injustice or a
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right.
CONCLUSION
147 We conclude that the PCRA does not limit this court's
authority to grant post-conviction relief to justice court
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defendants. We further conclude that Lucero failed to exhaust
his legal remedies and that he is not otherwise entitled to a
review of his petition for post-conviction relief under the
unusual circumstances exception. We therefore affirm.

SI48 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Durrant's
opinion.
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